Institutionalization as a prerequisite for sustainable corporate development by Wijen, F.H. (Frank)
  
 
Institutionalization as a Prerequisite for 
Sustainable Corporate Development 
 
 
 
Frank Wijen 
 
Department of Strategic Management and Business Environment 
RSM Erasmus University 
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
e-mail: fwijen@rsm.nl 
tel: 31- 10- 408 1985 
fax: 31- 10- 408 9013 
 
 
 
 
Published in: Sanjay Sharma, Mark Starik, and Bryan Husted (Eds), Organizations 
and the sustainability mosaic: Crafting long-term ecological and societal solutions, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham & Northampton, 2007,  p. 106-132. 
 
 
  1
Institutionalization as a Prerequisite for Sustainable Corporate 
Development 
 
 
Summary 
Numerous companies have embraced sustainable development or, similarly, corporate 
social responsibility as a guiding principle. While the adoption of this principle is 
important, the realization of sustained performance progress towards more sustainable 
business is a tremendous challenge which many academics and practitioners have 
sidestepped. This chapter examines the dynamic forces promoting and thwarting the 
development of a company pursuing sustainable business. I draw on an extensive case 
study of a large multinational food company committed to the achievement of 
environmentally sustainable business, whose performance initially rose and 
subsequently regressed. Analyzing the case through the lenses of stakeholder power 
and organizational learning, I conclude that sustained progress towards sustainable 
business (‘institutionalized sustainability’) requires: (i) a high and widely shared 
environmental ambition; and (ii) well-embedded environmental practices. Companies 
which emphasize only the ambition dimension, leading to an ‘idealist sustainability 
quest,’ or merely the embeddedness aspect, resulting in ‘realist environmental 
management,’ are unlikely to gain and sustain momentum during their sustainability 
voyage. Managers should, therefore, lever company-wide support, routinize and 
systematize environmental activities, and integrate the latter into their business as 
usual. Academics should concurrently consider the complementary perspectives of 
power and learning and undertake more longitudinal studies to better understand the 
drivers and caveats of sustainable business development. 
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Introduction 
 
The notion of sustainable development has come into vogue, both in academia and in 
business circles. After its introduction in 1987 by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (‘the Brundtland Commission’), the idea of meeting 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs has been widely embraced in the management literature as the 
reconciliation of environmental, social, and economic imperatives (Elkington 1998; 
Hart 1995; Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 2000; Holliday, Schmidheiny, and Watts 
2002). Quite a few companies have adopted principles of sustainable business or, 
similarly, corporate (social) responsibility (Husted 2003; Smith 2003; Van Tulder and 
Van der Zwart 2006). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), representing many such proactive companies, numbers some 165 
members with aggregate annual sales of 4,000 billion US dollars (Stigson and 
Rendlen 2005). 
While the principles of sustainable business have thus been widely embraced, it 
is less clear to what extent this has materialized in more sustainable practices, 
especially since it concerns the realization of a systemic equilibrium over a longer 
period (Ehrenfeld 2005; Roome 1998). However, the question of whether sustainable 
business will be sustained is particularly relevant, since the notion may be subject to 
implementation problems and erosion owing to changing ‘management fads’ or 
unfavourable economic tides. This chapter examines whether efforts to conduct 
sustainable business are accompanied by more sustainable practices over a longer 
period. In particular, the chapter seeks to identify the critical conditions that lead to 
the success or failure from the viewpoint of sustainable business development. In 
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order to do so, I draw on an extensive case study of a large multinational food 
company that had committed itself to the realization of environmentally sustainable 
development; the social dimension of sustainability was not an issue. This firm, for 
reasons of anonymity called ‘Greenheart’, was intensively studied over a five-year 
period. The case is particularly interesting because of its dynamics: an initially 
successful move towards sustainable business was reversed after some time due to the 
concurrence of critical events. I extensively describe the case in order to provide all 
relevant information, which serves as input for the subsequent analysis of the 
company’s behaviour through the conceptual lenses of stakeholder influence and 
organizational learning.  
The chapter’s main conclusion is that the successful pursuit of sustainable 
corporate development requires companies to institutionalize their environmental 
activities. The institutionalization of sustainable business has two dimensions: (i) 
companies must have a high and widely shared environmental ambition; and (ii) firms 
must deeply embed their environmental practices. On the basis of these dimensions, I 
identify different types of corporate sustainability behaviour. While the study has 
focused on the environmental dimension of sustainable corporate development, it is 
likely that institutionalization is also required for social sustainability. The conclusion 
has important implications for academia. Since the perspectives of stakeholder power 
and organizational learning show important parallels and complementarities, they 
should be used in conjunction. Besides, the proliferation of longitudinal studies would 
significantly further our understanding of the dynamics of sustainable business 
development. The study’s outcomes also have significant managerial implications, 
since high environmental (and social) performance requires not only top-management 
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ambition but also company-wide support, routinization and systemization, and tight 
integration with other activities.  
 
 
Case Description 
 
The case study is an appropriate technique to understand processes and causes of 
complex social phenomena (Ragin 1987; Yin 1994). A ‘critical’ case provides 
detailed insights and is representative of a focal phenomenon. The outcomes of such a 
study have implications going beyond the scope of the focal case (Gerring 2001; Yin 
1994). The focal organization was selected because it had made an important 
commitment to the pursuit of corporate sustainability. Case information was collected 
at five points in time over the period 1999-2004, through in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with the company’s major internal and external actors, the perusal of firm-
specific and other documents, as well as observations during site visits. Overall, some 
60 information sources were used. All relevant data were transcribed and 
systematically coded with the help of Atlas/ti, an effective qualitative software 
package (Weitzman and Miles 1995). The codes were based on contextual and 
theoretical issues, such as antecedents, environmental measures, stakeholder power, 
and organizational learning. After removing redundant information, the coded 
transcripts were converted into the case description; they also provided the basis for 
the subsequent analysis. 
The case description starts with the company’s history in order to highlight the 
chronology of critical events that shaped the corporate identity and practices. I then 
describe the environmental measures and performance by the focal company, in order 
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to assess the actual actions and outcomes in terms of environmental sustainability. 
The subsection on environmental management structure shows how the making and 
implementation of environmentally relevant decisions were officially designed. Next, 
I identify the most significant internal and external stakeholders, since their formal 
and informal influences critically shaped the company’s sustainability voyage. 
 
Case History 
 
Greenheart was created around 1900. Starting as a small, craftsman-like Dutch food 
producer, it had evolved into a large corporation with over 20 subsidiaries on 4 
continents, employing over three thousand people, by the end of the 20th century. The 
last years of the previous century especially showed high increases of its sales and 
employees. Its branded food products were sold all around the globe. Greenheart had 
one particularly successful product, which was the second best-selling product of the 
sector worldwide. However, the company sensed that its sales were levelling off in an 
increasingly competitive market. This led to a radical decision. Early in 2001, the 
family that had, by and large, owned Greenheart for a century, sold its shares to a 
foreign, family-owned company, which was also operating in the food industry; the 
buyer had already possessed a minority interest of Greenheart’s equity for several 
years. All shares, including those that were traded on the public stock market, fell into 
the hands of the new owner.  
Prior to the take-over, Greenheart was run by one and the same chief executive 
officer (CEO) for 25 years. This CEO, who retired after the take-over, shared with his 
family predecessors a deep personal, religiously inspired conviction that nature is in a 
very critical situation. This conviction had far-reaching implications for the corporate 
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values. Environmental concern was one of the four major values mentioned in the 
corporate mission statement and was a recurrent theme in the annual corporate report. 
In 1990, the CEO embraced the conclusions of the ‘Brundtland report’ on the 
worrying condition of globally interrelated ecosystems. The company created a fund 
for environmentally benign investments which did not meet the corporation’s normal 
financial standards. It also started to transfer 1% of its net annual profit to societal 
initiatives that aimed at the creation of environmental awareness at large. Within the 
highest strategic forums, the CEO fulfilled the role of environmental value-keeper. 
The social dimension of sustainability was not articulated and no major initiatives 
were taken to promote social values within the company. 
The new owner did not share this environmental sustainability drive. He had 
bought Greenheart because of its marketing and profit potential. After the take-over, 
which was formally a merger, the enlarged company (‘Greenheart Plus’) had more 
than doubled Greenheart’s original sales volume, ranking among the global top-ten 
producers in its sector, with some 30 subsidiaries and over 8,000 employees 
throughout the world.  
While the environmental value did not completely fade into the background, 
there was a significant shift in the corporate value attributed to the environment. This 
was reflected in a different mission statement. In 1995, Greenheart’s mission was 
stated as follows: “We care for the environment, and are dedicated to reducing our 
impact to a sustainable level.” Greenheart interpreted sustainability as conducting its 
business activities without negatively affecting the environment. The company had 
the ambition to realize its understanding of environmentally sustainable business by 
the year 2005. In 2002, after a year of negotiation between representatives of the 
former and the new owner, the following corporate mission was formulated: “We, 
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employees of  [Greenheart Plus] (…) cherish the role that we play in our own [social 
and natural] environment[s], because we work for an organization that is dedicated to 
both society and the environment.” A statement of norms and values was created as a 
compromise, adding that “We want to limit our impact on the environment as much as 
possible, and work towards long-term sustainability.” It should be noted, though, that 
no time period was added and that the highest corporate objective, reflected in a 
vision statement, did not mention the environment: “We want to reinforce our 
position as a world leader in the [food] industry, and want to offer people added value 
by creating appealing quality products.” While care for the environment was therefore 
still an official objective, it was no longer one of the highest corporate values. 
Besides, the Top Management Team (TMT) of Greenheart Plus interpreted 
environmental care differently, as stated in the 2003 environmental report of the main 
Dutch subsidiary: “The aim is no longer sustainable management but control of the 
environmental load stemming from one’s own business activities.” 
Greenheart had a tradition of open communication with the outside world. It 
participated in several reflection platforms, for example, with the Dutch Ministry of 
the Environment and a business platform of food producers that had committed 
themselves to sustainable development. The new owner was much more reluctant to 
convey information to external parties. By the end of 2002, Greenheart Plus had 
ended its membership of the different reflection platforms and basically confined its 
external environmental contacts to those with regulative authorities. Financial and 
environmental performance figures, which were published on an annual basis until the 
year 2000, were no longer publicly announced. 
By the end of 2000, an external crisis that affected one of the components of 
Greenheart’s main product induced the company, for safety reasons, to conduct an 
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overnight change in its product composition. This change led to significant production 
problems, including an extraordinarily high rate of defective products, which 
exceeded 20% instead of the ‘normal’ 10-15% waste rate. These production problems 
had a very negative effect on Greenheart’s financial and environmental performance 
in 2001 and 2002. As a result, a major reorganization took place in 2003, in which 
30% of the Dutch employees lost their jobs. Worldwide, many top managers with 
environmental commitment left the company and were replaced by people who were 
unfamiliar with the company’s (environmental) antecedents. 
 
Environmental Measures and Performance 
 
During the 1990s, Greenheart took a host of internal environmental measures to 
reduce the company’s environmental impact, starting with measures that were easy to 
realize (‘low-hanging fruit’). These included: the purification and recycling of 
effluent water; the use of surface water for cooling purposes; the separation and 
recycling of solid waste; a green office plan (the use of recycled paper, the use of 
LPG for company-owned cars, the separation of solid waste, etc.); the use of thinner 
packing materials; and the local procurement of materials by an overseas subsidiary to 
avoid long-distance transport. Greenheart also installed solar panels and wind turbines 
at some production sites, which yielded the public image of a highly proactive 
company. When further internal measures were not feasible within the existing 
technical frames, external compensation measures were taken. Examples of this are a 
reforestation project and the purchase of energy from renewable resources (‘green 
electricity’) to compensate for excess emissions of carbon dioxide.  
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Early in 2000, the arrival of a new corporate environmental coordinator gave an 
impetus to new technical measures, such as closing water loops through the use of 
advanced membrane systems and reverse osmosis. Besides, additional measures were 
studied: stock-taking of short-term environmental improvement possibilities; product 
chain management, involving qualitatively and quantitatively different supplies (this 
was important because 60% of the environmental impact of Greenheart’s main 
product was situated elsewhere in the product chain); the development of a 
sustainability management system in which managerial bonuses were related to 
environmental performance; and the replacement of the existing batch technology 
production method, leading to a ‘normal’ 10+% rate of defective products, by 
continuous process technology, including closed systems and better process control. 
Continuous production would involve lower energy and water consumption, and 
lower emission levels of solid waste and effluent water.  
Apart from these actual and envisaged technical measures, Greenheart engaged 
in initiatives to create environmental awareness. This was stimulated at all levels, 
ranging from the highest strategic levels to the shop floor. Awareness recurred on the 
agenda of the company’s strategic forums, was part of corporate training programs, 
and was propagated through an internal, bimonthly environmental pamphlet. 
Furthermore, special environmental days were organized to clean up the environment 
and there was social pressure among employees. A marketing manager noted: “When 
I leave my office while the light is on, someone else will turn it off, and say: ‘Watch 
it.’” It should be noted, however, that environmental values were upheld by a 
minority, which had to activate a benevolent but passive majority of employees. A 
field visit in 1999 left one with the impression that operating personnel in particular 
seemed to lack environmental awareness. In the early 2000s, the commitment to 
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environmentally inspired actions decreased due to financial difficulties and the 
departure of many top managers with environmental commitment. 
After the take-over, environmental actions were reoriented towards those that 
were either required by law or to cost-effective measures, which paid themselves back 
within less than two years owing to savings on raw materials or other inputs. Three 
environmental priorities were identified: enhanced energy efficiency, decreased 
volumes of (effluent) water, and decreased production waste. This led to measures 
such as the refinement of production techniques, tracing and repairing leakages of 
compressed air, and the increased recycling of effluent water. Environmental projects 
that were not directly rewarding, such as awareness creation, research on continuous 
production and on product chain management, the conceptualization of sustainability, 
the elaboration of a sustainability management system, external compensation 
measures, and the development of renewable energy, came to an end. The annual 
budget of over 2 million euros for environmental actions, that had been agreed upon 
before the take-over, was frozen when the financial tide was rough and eventually 
faded into obscurity.  
 
In the 1990s, Greenheart measured its environmental impact through a 
quantitative, tailor-made environmental barometer, which focused on 5 global areas of 
environmental disruption: greenhouse gases, acidification, water consumption, 
effluent water, and solid waste. In each of these areas, the barometer measured the 
distance to the final target, which was a zero impact. Greenheart’s environmental 
distance to target, as measured by the barometer, dropped from 25 in 1992 to 15 in 
1996 and 12 in 1999. Afterwards, the exact score was unknown because 
environmental data were no longer systematically collected and analyzed. It was 
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clear, however, that the distance-to-target had risen again because of the production-
related problems and because of a higher automation rate. It was also felt that one 
overall figure was not very explanatory, because the indicator was built up of a large 
number of heterogeneous components. It was therefore decided to abandon the 
existing barometer and to use more specific indicators. After the dramatic year 2002, 
with its important production-related problems, the performance at the main Dutch 
production site showed, by and large, progress in the (newly) designated priority areas 
of energy efficiency, production waste rate, and fresh-water consumption and 
effluent-water production. At the same time, this subsidiary did not fully meet all 
regulative requirements, especially administrative obligations. 
 
Environmental Management Structure 
 
Prior to the take-over, the environmental objectives were initiated and ratified at 
Greenheart’s strategic apex. Environmental issues used to be a recurrent agenda point 
of meetings between the CEO, who was the environmental value-keeper, and other 
members of the corporate TMT, each of whom represented either a geographic cluster 
of markets or a key functional area. An environmental policy group, consisting of 
representatives from different functional disciplines and headed by the corporate 
environmental coordinator, prepared advice for the corporate TMT. Once the TMT 
had ratified environmental proposals, its decisions were conveyed to the managers of 
the respective subsidiaries. The managers were formally responsible for the 
implementation of TMT decisions by their subsidiaries.  
The corporate environmental coordinator then discussed the implementation of 
TMT decisions with the managers of the different subsidiaries. The subsidiary 
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environmental coordinators, who combined this function with other activities, were 
subsequently supposed to convene environmental working groups. Such working 
groups consisted of representatives from the different functional disciplines 
concerned, as well as a corporate technical staff member and an external adviser. The 
environmental working groups brainstormed different options for improvement 
projects and retained the most viable ones. However, most environmental initiatives 
were taken on an ad hoc basis since these groups were never fully operational, apart 
from the one in Greenheart’s largest production subsidiary, which started functioning 
well from 2000 onwards. Working groups obtained technical support from the 
corporate technical staff, which was also in charge of eco-efficient sourcing (saving 
both money and natural resources), environmental training, and setting up a company-
wide environmental database. Subsidiaries needed to regularly report to and obtain 
approval from corporate bodies for projects with substantial financial implications. 
Approved proposals were converted into action plans for the next year. Figure 1 
summarizes Greenheart’s main structural tenets prior to the take-over. The solid lines 
indicate formal relationships, while the dashed lines represent information flows. The 
rectangular boxes are line functions, ovals represent staff functions, and octagons 
indicate (permanent or ad hoc) working groups.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
After the take-over, the environmental management’s centre of gravity 
progressively shifted from the corporate to the subsidiary level. The corporate TMT, 
while still having a member representing the environmental value, focused on socio-
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economic targets and abstained, by and large, from launching new environmental 
initiatives. The new owner’s ‘lean and mean’ organization philosophy was applied to 
the corporate environmental department in 2003 when it was completely dismantled; 
in its wake, company-wide activities such as the exchange of corporate environmental 
data and the alignment of local environmental policies halted. All environmental 
responsibilities were allocated to subsidiaries, who focused on locally relevant issues, 
particularly regulative compliance and cost savings with (positive) environmental side 
effects. While a formal management system was not universally embraced, 
environmental issues were addressed in a more systematic way, at least in the Dutch 
subsidiaries. Operational Teams (OTs) were created, consisting of the production 
manager, the heads of different functional areas (manufacturing, packing, 
engineering, logistics, etc.), the environmental coordinator, and other staff officers 
(personnel, finance, quality control) of the respective subsidiaries. The OTs were 
endowed with ample formal and financial authority as well as knowledge of different 
functional areas, but faced capacity constraints since all persons were involved on a 
part-time basis. The teams convened once a month to evaluate past environmental 
performance, trace (overt and hidden) problems, discuss new targets, and formulate 
new action plans. These plans were subsequently implemented by the department(s) 
concerned and coordinated by the environmental coordinator, who had regular 
bilateral contacts with the persons involved. The aim was to set up a standardized 
plan-do-check-act system with parallels to quality management and leading to 
incremental but continuous performance improvements. The new environmental 
management structure is displayed in Figure 2.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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------------------------------ 
 
Internal and External Stakeholders 
 
The following actors, highlighted in italics, were the most salient stakeholders of 
Greenheart (Plus) in the environmental area during the period 1999-2004.  
The CEO who had led Greenheart for 25 years, until his retirement in 2001, was 
widely perceived as a very important stakeholder. He fulfilled two roles. As corporate 
value-keeper, he was in charge of guarding and stimulating environmental values 
within the company. His strong personal conviction regarding the necessity to stop 
environmental degradation was the driving force of Greenheart’s pursuit of 
environmental sustainability. Besides, the CEO was the highest corporate decision 
maker. He chaired the corporate TMT, and did not hesitate to use his formal power to 
put the environmental agenda forward: “Fortunately, I am the [CEO], which gives me 
a certain influence. If I had been any of the other colleagues, it would have been much 
more difficult.” 
In 2001, the new owner appointed another CEO, who wielded his considerable 
formal power predominantly to enhance the company’s financial performance. He did 
not attribute a high priority to environmental initiatives, except those which were 
financially rewarding. Whereas the former CEO was also the environmental value-
keeper, the new CEO delegated this function to another TMT member, who was 
clearly less influential. As a result, top management commitment to environmental 
sustainability sharply declined after the take-over. 
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A main activity of Greenheart’s corporate environmental coordinator during the 
period 1996-1999 was to coordinate company-wide environmental actions. He 
conveyed information from subsidiaries to the corporate environmental policy group, 
which advised the corporate TMT. The environmental coordinator (“actually, I am a 
bridgehead”) also had contacts with general managers and subsidiary environmental 
coordinators on the implementation of the corporate environmental policy and the 
exchange of new (technical) knowledge. Furthermore, he consulted with the corporate 
technical staff and had regular consultations with the CEO on environmental actions 
to be taken. The environmental coordinator’s external contacts included a 
government-led brainstorm group on corporate sustainability, an open dialogue with 
environmental pressure groups, technology-related contacts with universities, and 
meetings with external advisers. 
Early in 2000, a new corporate environmental coordinator was appointed. While 
his tasks were about the same as those of his predecessor, he had quite a different 
vision of this function, which was related to the fact that he came from the very 
different chemical industry. The new environmental coordinator heavily focused on 
technical innovation. Over a five-year period, he wanted to replace the existing batch-
wise production system, engendering a high waste rate, by a continuous, closed-flow 
production process, as was usual in the chemical industry. The environmental 
coordinator also wanted to achieve short-term technical improvements, introduce 
biodegradable packing, improve employee mentality, and integrate backwards in 
order to better control the environmental performance of Greenheart’s products over 
their entire life cycles. Early in 2003, the corporate environmental coordinator left the 
company when his position was abolished. 
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Greenheart’s subsidiary environmental coordinators were characterized by the 
corporate coordinator as quite important actors, because they were in charge of 
implementing the corporate environmental strategy at the shop floor level, for which 
the commitment of the operational staff was indispensable. Commitment was, 
however, compromised because of different objectives, involving competitive time 
claims. In 1999, a subsidiary environmental coordinator observed: “The main purpose 
of almost anyone in the production organization is to produce. When we come with 
our environmental activities, a choice has to be made: Do I let someone [make our 
products] (…) or save water? The choice, then, is made quickly: let the person make 
[a high volume of our products].” He concluded that there were conflicts of interest 
between targets at the corporate level and the subsidiary level as well as between 
environmental values embraced by blue-collar personnel (“who just come for the 
money”) and white-collar employees. 
After Greenheart Plus was restructured, the subsidiary environmental 
coordinators began to fulfil a central role by initiating and coordinating environmental 
actions. Several tensions disappeared. Since there was no more active corporate 
steering, the subsidiaries could largely formulate their own targets. Besides, different 
types of objectives were ‘reconciled’: environmental targets were formulated in 
economic terms, such as reduced waste rates leading to enhanced volumes of saleable 
products and reduced environmental load. In 2004, the environmental coordinator of a 
major subsidiary characterized this reorientation as “a shift from idealism to realism,” 
asserting that waste prevention and other eco-efficiency measures have a much higher 
environmental pay-off than any other measures. 
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Internal tensions also diminished because the targets between administrative and 
production personnel were aligned in the OTs,  which became effective from 2004 
onwards, at least in the Dutch subsidiaries. These teams were important because they 
provided complementary insights from different functional areas and, above all, 
management commitment to regularly establish, evaluate, and revise environmentally 
relevant targets. The OT was regarded by a local coordinator as “a pragmatic 
environmental management system that warrants structural attention to the 
environment.” 
 
The corporate technical staff was relatively important in 1999, because it 
formulated the company’s technical standards and provided solutions for prevailing 
environmental problems. The technical staff also played a role in more eco-efficient 
materials procurement, investment decisions, and the introduction of an interactive 
environmental database.  
After the take-over, the corporate technical staff was seriously downsized since 
the new owner regarded corporate bodies as an important source of indirect costs. The 
importance of the corporate technical staff to environmental issues progressively 
faded. By 2004, this body no longer played a significant role in the environmental 
area. 
 
National government was considered a very important actor. In the second half of 
the 1990s, a Dutch governmental representative coordinated a project on the 
application of the sustainability concept at the company level with three business 
organizations, including Greenheart, in divergent sectors. Greenheart’s corporate 
environmental coordinator at the time highly appreciated this “very good dialogue,” 
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because “they are in the position to constantly lobby, within other governmental 
departments and internationally, as to what are or may be the possible developments 
in the area of sustainability. It concerns, then, the development of insights from which 
our own ideas can be distilled, our own strategy can be adjusted. From that 
perspective, it is often very meaningful.” In 2001, the Dutch Ministry of the 
Environment and Greenheart cooperated in a project on the development of a 
sustainability management system, which aimed at linking environmental 
performance to managerial incentives. In 2003, contacts with national government 
were broken when the corporate environmental department was dismantled. 
 
By contrast, contacts with local governmental bodies, including municipalities 
and local water boards, were intensified after the reorganization. It was acknowledged 
that regulatory compliance had too readily been taken for granted. Local 
environmental issues such as noise and odour, which had previously been ignored in 
the sustainability barometer, were given more attention. In some areas, in particular 
the storage of dangerous substances and the communication of environmental data, 
several subsidiaries had not acted in compliance with the regulatory requirements 
over the period 2000-2004. Priority was then given to restoring compliance from 2005 
onwards, though understaffing of the environmental function remained a point of 
concern.  
 
Environmental pressure groups were regarded as slightly important because of 
their capacity to harm the company’s environmental image. An open communication 
was maintained with these groups. In 1999, an environmental representative viewed 
the company as very proactive indeed. “For years, [Greenheart] has been an absolute 
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leader in the field of environmental conditions.” The corporate coordinator viewed the 
attitude of the environmental movement as cooperative but devoid of inspiring ideas. 
After the disappearance of the corporate environmental department, contacts with the 
environmental movement ceased. 
 
Transport companies were of some importance to the company. Greenheart 
(Plus) had concluded energy efficiency agreements with the government and its 
performance was affected by the energy impact of transport to customers. The 
marketing department had regular contacts with transport companies on logistic 
optimization. A representative of the carrier admitted that the environment was not an 
issue when distributing goods. The carrier did not necessarily use clean trucks. 
Delivery schedules were determined by customer demands and timely deliveries often 
entailed partial truck-loads. After the take-over, when cost savings became a 
dominant issue, efforts to enhance the energy performance of Greenheart Plus’ 
distribution – through an enhanced loading degree, less frequent deliveries, etc. – 
were intensified, which engendered some environmental gains. 
 
 
Analysis  
 
Greenheart (Plus) from a Power Perspective 
 
During the 1990s, Greenheart’s sustainability drive was initiated and sustained by the 
CEO’s personal conviction that his company had to contribute to an environmentally 
sustainable world. The CEO incorporated the sustainability value into the company’s 
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mission. He also came up with, and provided ample support for, strategic objectives in 
the field of sustainability, which were implemented top-down through an elaborate 
environmental structure. Greenheart’s corporate environmental coordinator 
functioned as an information interface between the corporate and the subsidiary 
levels, translating strategic objectives into operational targets and feeding subsidiary 
performance back to the apex. Greenheart’s corporate technical staff provided know-
how to implement and standardize environmental initiatives. In the late 1990s, the 
sustainability value was widely shared among higher managers and white-collar 
workers, but there was a lack of commitment at the shop floor level. Despite 
persistent awareness creation efforts, the blue-collar workers predominantly pursued 
primary production targets. Subsidiary environmental coordinators faced the difficulty 
of getting concrete environmental initiatives implemented since they faced 
competitive time claims and because environmental activities did not constitute an 
integral part of the shop-floor routines. National government served as an important 
external ally to conceptualize corporate sustainability. Other external stakeholders – 
in particular, environmental pressure groups and transport companies – did not have a 
significant impact on Greenheart’s environmental behaviour.  
Power or influence has its origin in an actor (the influencer) holding resources 
such as authority, money, social norms, and information to which another actor (the 
influencee) is sensitive, leading to behaviour that the influencee would otherwise not 
display (Dahl 1957; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Etzioni 1964; French and Raven 
1968; Mintzberg 1983). The importance attached to Greenheart’s major stakeholders 
stemmed from the resources that they held, or to which they had access, and to which 
others were sensitive: formal authority (the CEO), economic resources (the CEO), 
environmental norms (the CEO), information (the corporate environmental 
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coordinator, the corporate technical staff, national government), and the ability to 
implement initiatives (the subsidiary environmental coordinators as representatives of 
blue-collar workers). The CEO took the lead, and wielded his formal, economic, and 
social power to push the environmental agenda. Most internal actors acquiesced in his 
authority. Only blue-collar workers showed a certain degree of passive resistance 
because of competitive time claims, personal indifference, and a lack of embedding in 
their daily activities. The company’s commitment to sustainability was initiated and 
spurred on top-down, and many environmental initiatives were supported. Ample 
formal, informational, and financial resources were allocated to the conceptualization 
and implementation of the sustainability objective. There was a tension at the shop 
floor level because operational influence was partially withheld from pursuing 
environmental targets, but still a significant number of concrete actions were taken. 
Thus, the dissimilar resources of different stakeholders were, by and large, used in a 
cooperative way, yielding synergetic effects. The ensuing rise of Greenheart’s 
sustainability performance was evidenced by a halving of its negative environmental 
impact, from 25 in 1992 to 12 in 1999. 
 
Two factors marked a discontinuity in the company’s environmental course of 
action. Following an external crisis in 2000, the composition of Greenheart’s best-
selling product was changed. This engendered important production problems and 
poor financial performance in major subsidiaries during the first years of the new 
millennium. The corporate TMT then attributed the highest priority to a short-term 
improvement of output and profit figures, ultimately involving a major reorganization. 
From 2001 onwards, many employees ranked the sustainability cause lower than 
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before because they felt that their jobs were threatened. As a result, the drive of most 
internal actors to pursue environmental targets decreased significantly.  
A second factor of significance was the change of CEO. The former CEO, who 
had led Greenheart for over 25 years, was succeeded by a person who attributed much 
less importance to the environmental value. The new CEO decided that environmental 
initiatives should be confined to those that were required by law or that paid 
themselves back. He dismantled the corporate environmental department and 
marginalized or replaced many (critical) higher managers with ‘fresh,’ 
environmentally disinterested outsiders. At the same time, the new CEO grounded 
environmental aspects on a more structural basis into the organization by creating 
OTs at the subsidiary level. The perception of relevant external stakeholders also 
shifted from those actors contributing new conceptual insights into industrial 
sustainability (such as national government) towards those parties needed to comply 
with regulation (in particular, local governments). 
As a result of these changes, internal stakeholders wielded their power towards 
externally required actions and (internal) measures with immediate economic pay-
offs. Formal influence changed from fully-fledged, normative support for 
environmental actions to cautious, calculative endorsement. The nature of 
informational influence turned from external and global to internal and local. The 
operational support for environmental initiatives was fostered through a new structure 
and the concurrence of productive and environmental targets. In these new spheres of 
influence, the actions of different internal actors were no longer coordinated at the 
corporate level, giving rise to more divergent practices across subsidiaries. By 
contrast, environmental measures within subsidiaries were more coherent, consistent, 
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and structured than before, enhancing the efficiency of Greenheart Plus’ 
environmental initiatives.  
At the same time, the company’s overall environmental ambition level had 
considerably decreased, since sustainability was no longer of primary importance. 
This suggests that the sustainability value was less deeply rooted than might be 
expected. Certain actors tried to uphold the ambitious objective and were 
subsequently marginalized. Most internal stakeholders, though, showed little 
resistance towards the erosion of this value, suggesting that the pursuit of 
environmental sustainability was neither firmly embedded in the tissue of influential 
internal actors nor in the company’s routines. While a direct comparison between the 
period before the major changes and the epoch afterwards is delicate owing to a 
change of environmental yardsticks, it seems obvious that the altered balance of 
power led to a regression of the company’s environmental behaviour. 
 
 
Greenheart (Plus) from a Learning Perspective 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Greenheart’s environmental performance, such as evidenced 
by the environmental barometer, improved dramatically. This progress was not 
necessarily the consequence of increased insights into environmental issues. Measures 
such as financing reforestation projects and procuring renewable electricity favoured 
the company’s environmental performance but not per se its understanding of their 
technical nature. However, a substantial part of Greenheart’s enhanced environmental 
performance was induced by the accumulation of new insights pertaining to the 
conceptualization and implementation of industrial sustainability. The company 
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continued acquiring new environmental insights after the turn of the millennium, be it 
at a reduced pace, but the nature of newly acquired knowledge changed from 
predominantly strategic and conceptual to exclusively operational and applied. 
Organizations learn when they increase their behavioural capacities owing to 
information processing, which involves the acquisition, sharing, and retention of new 
knowledge (Argote 1999; Huber 1991; Kim 1993). Greenheart (Plus) acquired new 
information from a variety of sources: experimenting with new production practices 
such as reducing production waste, enhancing energy efficiency, and recycling 
effluent water; participating in reflective platforms on the conceptualization of 
sustainability; and adopting externally developed insights, such as those on 
continuous production. Greenheart shared new knowledge through: employees, in 
particular, environmental coordinators and corporate technical staff members; 
documented information, including a (not fully operational) environmental data-base 
and an environmental magazine; and technical equipment and practices, such as the 
use of solar panels and the recycling of effluent water. The sources of information 
sharing largely coincided with those of information storage: employees, documents, 
equipment, etc.  
New insights that are related to cues like discovery, effectiveness, and innovation 
give rise to explorative learning, whereas insights that are strongly linked to existing 
practices – involving terms like adaptation, efficiency, and implementation – lead to 
exploitative learning (March 1991; Weick and Westley 1996). Greenheart’s search for 
conceptual clarity, its engagement with a variety of heterogeneous, strategically 
significant actors, and the consideration of new types of production methods in the 
late 1990s are all indicators of explorative learning. Operational measures were 
largely taken on an ad hoc basis. Well-functioning environmental routines, firmly 
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embedded in an integrative structure, were largely absent. After the two major events, 
the company ceased its quest for business as unusual. While its explorative learning 
came to a halt, Greenheart Plus focused on exploitative learning. Existing practices 
were refined through minor adaptations of its production methods. This occurred on a 
systematic basis and was relatively well embedded at the operational level. 
 
Organizational learning is most effective when different roles concur: idea 
generators who creatively combine technologies, markets, and products; internal 
entrepreneurs who apply new knowledge to concrete settings; boundary spanners who 
link local colleagues to external information sources; and sponsors who provide 
senior-management support for new ideas (Tushman and Nadler 1996; Nonaka 1996; 
Senge 1999). In the 1990s, different actors fulfilled key roles in Greenheart’s learning 
process. Reflection platforms (with national government, with other companies in the 
food sector) as well as the last corporate environmental coordinator functioned as idea 
generators on the conceptualization of industrial sustainability. Greenheart’s corporate 
environmental coordinators diffused salient environmental information, both from 
outward-in and from the strategic forums to the subsidiaries, thus acting as boundary 
spanners. Greenheart’s CEO provided ample top management support for 
sustainability initiatives, thus fulfilling the role of sponsor. Only the role of internal 
entrepreneur was not well articulated within the company. The concurrence of three 
major learning roles led to a fairly effective organizational learning process.  
The events of the early 2000s had major implications for learning roles. The 
change of CEO led to the disappearance of a major sponsor since formal top 
management support became weak and financial resources dried up. This was, to a 
certain extent, compensated by an increased formal commitment of subsidiary TMTs 
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to local environmental initiatives. Idea generators were no longer considered since 
contacts with external reflection platforms were broken and the corporate 
environmental coordinator was dismissed. By contrast, the role of internal 
entrepreneur became more articulated through the OTs, who had to come up with 
concrete solutions. The role of boundary spanner shifted from the corporate 
environmental coordinator to the subsidiary coordinators, whereby it should be noted 
that the latter faced significant time constraints. Greenheart Plus thus showed the 
concurrence of three critical learning roles, though these roles were not highly 
articulated. Consequently, the company learned efficiently but at a lower pace than 
before. 
Learning requires the allocation of sufficient resources for the acquisition and 
processing of new insights (Cyert and March 1992; Nonaka 1994; Senge 1999). In the 
late 1990s, relatively ample resources were available at Greenheart, with the 
exception of the shop-floor level. The availability of these resources, secured by top 
management support, enabled the company to progress on a highly ambitious learning 
path. After the two discontinuities, in the early 2000s, Greenheart Plus lowered its 
environmental ambition level. The budget for environmental initiatives was frozen, 
the corporate environmental department was eliminated, the corporate technical staff 
and external reflection platforms were marginalized, and no additional environmental 
staff was hired at the subsidiary level. The scarcity of resources for environmental 
initiatives slowed down the company’s learning process.  
 
Greenheart’s quest for environmental sustainability is summarized in Table 1. 
Analytical insights from the two perspectives (stakeholder influence and 
organizational learning) are summarized using two major dimensions that emerged 
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from the data: (i) the relative importance that organizational members attribute to 
environmental sustainability (‘ambition’); and (ii) the degree to which environmental 
practices are an integrative part of the company’s business as usual (‘embeddedness’). 
The table shows largely divergent outcomes for Greenheart’s subsequent stages of 
rise and regression.  
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
The case study shows the evolution of a company in its quest for environmental 
sustainability. Greenheart initially made great strides: the organization embraced 
sustainability as a core value, sought to reconceptualize its business activities, was 
open to a variety of (external) stakeholders, and allocated ample means to reduce its 
environmental impact. This venture lost momentum after a change of ownership and 
economic difficulties: the sustainability value was interpreted in a more restricted 
sense and became of secondary importance, environmental activities had to fit within 
the existing business frame, a more restricted number of predominantly internal 
stakeholders were considered, and the environmental budget largely evaporated; at the 
same time, environmental activities were undertaken on a more structural basis. 
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These findings suggest that the focal company went through subsequent phases 
of rise and regression during its sustainability voyage. The literature has described 
different levels of progress on the corporate sustainability path, ranging from early 
stages involving eco-efficiency and pollution control measures to more advanced 
stages of business process reconceptualization and product redesign (Sharma and 
Henriques 2005). Alternatively, different corporate attitudes to environmental issues 
have been identified: from defensive and reactive, as evidenced by resistance to 
environmental initiatives, via compliance with regulatory requirements to offensive 
and proactive, with a prominent role for discretionary (that is, not legally required) 
environmental initiatives and ample top management commitment (Henriques and 
Sadorsky 1999; Kolk and Mauser 2002; Zadek 2004). Similarly, companies can be 
classified on the basis of their environmental management styles: from laggards, 
trying to evade environmental measures, via compliers to true believers, who take far-
reaching measures on moral grounds (Thornton, Kagan, and Gunningham 2003). 
Indeed, it has been argued that the ‘normative case’ for environmental initiatives, 
consisting of morally driven actions, tends to be associated with higher levels of 
proactiveness than the ‘business case,’ where fear of regulatory retaliation and 
economic self-interest are more dominant considerations (Garriga and Melé 2004; 
Smith 2003). 
 
While the focal company can easily be accommodated within the different 
classification schemes, the extant literature tends to assume, sometimes explicitly but 
mostly implicitly, that companies either adopt and maintain a particular 
environmental attitude or show increasing levels of proactiveness over time (Porter 
and Van der Linde 1995; Hart, 1995; Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 2000; Holliday, 
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Schmidheiny, and Watts 2002; Shrivastava, 1995). This assumption seems to be based 
on the following line of reasoning. Companies generally ignore environmental issues 
until they are forced to comply with regulatory requirements. Once they are forced to 
take environmental actions, they ‘discover’ their economic benefits, in terms of 
improved reputation, enhanced sales potential, cost savings, and/or avoided liability 
claims. A final step is taken when business leaders make their organizations behave 
like good corporate citizens and take far-reaching measures on moral grounds, 
regardless of their immediate pay-offs. This pattern of rising proactiveness may have 
occurred in quite a few instances, but is by no means an iron law. The Greenheart case 
shows that a company’s rise in environmental performance may be followed by a 
period of regression.  
The analysis in the previous section identified two reasons for this regression. 
The first pertains to the company’s ambition level. When Greenheart Plus entered 
economically turbulent waters, the environmental objective became less prominent. 
The economic difficulties encountered and the change of ownership were important 
reasons for this lower priority. Saliently, the environmental regression met with 
hardly any internal resistance. Virtually all employees acquiesced in the reshuffling of 
corporate values. They accepted the new top-management priorities and preferred job 
security to the pursuit of environmental objectives. The vulnerability of the 
environmental value feeds the critique that corporate environmental or social 
initiatives should be regarded with suspicion since the primary raison d’être is an 
economic one (Hertz 2001; Klein 2001). An alternative argument is that since the 
sustainability drive had been largely imposed top-down, the environmental value had 
been neither widely nor deeply embraced throughout the organization. Change 
initiatives based on hierarchical power are unstable: they tend to fade over time since 
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they lack wide (internal) support (Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings 2001). Widespread 
endorsement is thus key to sustained progress, especially when it concerns new 
initiatives. From a learning perspective, the withdrawal of resources required to 
involve organizational members fulfilling critical roles leads to reduced progress on 
learning paths entered (Senge 1999). It can thus be concluded that the pursuit of 
corporate sustainability requires high ambition, not only at the top-management level 
but also throughout the organization. High ambition shows similarities with the 
related notion of shared vision (Senge 1990; Shrivastava, 1995), since both highlight 
the importance of organization-wide support. High ambition, however, goes beyond 
shared vision, since the former also connotes commitment to (environmental) 
challenges that are hard to realize (Simon 1976; Vergragt and Van der Wel, 1998). 
 
The second reason for regression was the lack of well-embedded environmental 
practices. Greenheart used to take a variety of environmental initiatives, but they were 
largely adopted on an ad hoc basis. Had these actions been more firmly embedded in 
ongoing routines, they would probably have been more resistant to changed top 
management priorities. Routinized practices, which have been adopted throughout the 
company and which have persisted for some time, are particularly inert. They are 
likely to meet with fierce resistance when attempts to change them are undertaken 
(Cyert and March 1992; Nelson and Winter 1982; Tushman and Romanelli 1985). 
Besides, Greenheart’s environmental activities were largely taken in isolation, without 
benefitting from the synergies and ‘protection’ of intertwined activities. The 
integration of environmental and economic activities leads to the exploitation of 
common grounds and avoids, at least to a certain extent, the need to prioritize one 
type of activity over another when resource limitations would call for such choices 
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(Porter and Van der Linde 1995). Furthermore, systematically implemented activities 
that lead to measurable results, including environmental management systems such as 
ISO 14001, are more resistant to unfavourable economic tides and changing top 
management priorities than conceptual and ad-hoc measures (Bansal and Bogner 
2002). Therefore, environmental practices must be deeply embedded in corporate 
practices in order to sustain the pursuit of sustainable business. Embeddedness is 
related to structure (Argote 1999; Mintzberg 1979), since both pertain to the way in 
which (environmental) activities are organized. Embeddedness is more related to 
permanence, though, since structure concerns the officially designed and readily 
changeable modus operandi, whereas embeddedness expresses the actual degree of 
ingrained commitment to existing cognitive frames and practices (Uzzi 1996, 1997). 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
The above results should be interpreted with some caution, since they are based 
on a single case study. An important conclusion from the analysis is thus that 
companies can only display environmentally sustainable behaviour over a longer 
period if they have: (i) a high and widely shared environmental ambition; and (ii) 
well-embedded environmental practices. The behaviour of such organizations can be 
labelled as ‘institutionalized sustainability.’ (cf. Ackerman 1973). Institutions refer to 
collectively taken-for-granted behaviour, materialized through widely accepted 
practices, rules, and technologies (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; 
Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The two dimensions 
identified are critical to understanding the behaviour of organizations over a longer 
period. Sustaining corporate sustainability efforts requires both deeply held and 
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widely embraced values (the ‘ambition’ dimension) and the adoption of ingrained, 
routinized practices (the ‘embeddedness’ dimension). Companies scoring high on the 
ambition dimension but low on the embeddedness dimension, such as tended to be the 
case with Greenheart prior to the critical events, are engaged in an ‘idealist 
sustainability quest.’ Their actions are conceptual, ad hoc, and symbolic. By contrast, 
companies with a low ambition level but a high degree of embeddedness, as tended to 
be evidenced by Greenheart Plus, are characterized by ‘realist environmental 
management.’ They are concerned with the systematic implementation of technically 
feasible measures, the scope of which is not to attain environmentally sustainable 
levels. The different types of behaviour related to corporate environmental 
sustainability are displayed in Table 2.  
The present study has mainly focused on the environmental dimension of 
sustainable corporate development, though the outcomes may also be relevant for 
social sustainability. Many social and environmental issues in business share features 
such as a systemic nature, a dual (normative and business) character, and a ‘natural 
subordination’ to economic imperatives. Therefore, institutionalization would seem to 
be critical for both the environmental and social dimensions of sustainable corporate 
development. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
An important managerial implication is thus that maintaining environmental (and 
social) sustainability requires high degrees of ambition and embeddedness. Sustained 
excellence in environmental (and social) performance requires not only top-
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management ambition but also company-wide support; this invalidates top-down 
decision-making models which overlook the implementation side. Routinization and 
systemization are imperative since ad hoc measures are ephemeral. Formal 
environmental management systems such as ISO 14001 are instrumental in this 
respect (Epstein and Roy 2001), though such systems have no built-in ambition level 
(Bansal and Bogner 2002) and the tacit knowledge of employees should also be 
mobilized (Boiral 2002). Furthermore, tight integration with other activities is 
required, implying that isolated environmental (and social) departments are counter-
productive.  
 
The analysis of the focal company was performed from two different 
perspectives: organizational learning and stakeholder influence. Both paradigms are 
rooted in extensive bodies of literature (For overviews of the organizational learning 
literature, see Argote 1999, Baum 2002, and Dierkes, Antal, Child, and Nonaka 2002; 
synopses of the stakeholder influence literature can be found in Baum 2002, Hardy 
and Clegg 1996, and Kramer and Neale 1998). Notwithstanding the substantial 
number of writings proliferated by each body, the crossroads of learning and 
influence have hardly been explored (Contu and Willmott 2003; Weick and Westley 
1996). However, the outcomes from both analyses, which were summarized in Table 
1, showed striking parallels when related to the dimensions of ambition and 
embeddedness. Both perspectives are also complementary (Gladwin 1993). On the 
one hand, stakeholder influence shapes organizational learning; the latter becomes 
effective when influential actors allocate the resources needed to learn (Senge 1999; 
Roome and Wijen 2006; Tushman and Nadler 1996). Besides, actors have to be 
sufficiently powerful to fulfil critical learning roles effectively (Contu and Willmott 
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2003; Coopey 1996; Roome and Wijen 2006). On the other hand, organizational 
learning affects a company’s power relations: the more insights are acquired 
concerning the desirability or necessity to consider certain actors, the more an 
organization will perceive these actors as important and become sensitive to their 
resources (Nooteboom 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Using the complementary 
perspectives of stakeholder power and organizational learning in conjunction with 
each other, therefore, significantly enhances our insights.  
Besides, it is important to study organizations over a longer period in order to 
observe unfolding dynamics, especially in the field of sustainable development. 
Longitudinal studies show not only the mechanisms leading to changes but also reveal 
the degree to which intended changes are sustained over a longer period. Many 
academic studies have focused on inertia and resistance to change (Baum 2002; 
Gersick 1991; Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Valley and Thompson 1998). 
Sustaining environmentally (and socially) relevant behavioural changes against all 
odds over a longer period has received far less attention, though this issue is 
particularly relevant when organizations have not yet institutionalized 
environmentally (and socially) relevant practices (Senge 1999). Indeed, 
institutionalization is a prerequisite for sustainable corporate development, key to 
understanding the conditions under which sustainable development can turn from 
well-intended management by exception into widely practised business as usual. 
Longitudinal studies focusing on how attempts to conduct more sustainable business 
are initiated, leveraged, and maintained would further our understanding of such 
institutionalization processes. 
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The present chapter has unpacked the mechanisms underlying the dynamic 
behaviour of a company pursuing environmental sustainability. Many writings 
pertaining to drivers of sustainable development or corporate social responsibility 
point to isolated factors such as enlightened leadership, a competitive edge, and 
societal pressure. By contrast, this chapter suggests that the development of corporate 
sustainability requires the concurrence of ambition and embeddedness. The higher the 
scores on these dimensions and the more systemic the corporate orientation, the more 
a company has institutionalized its sustainability endeavour and the higher the 
probability of sustained progress. Companies highlighting only one dimension have a 
lower performance and are vulnerable to (economic and managerial) vagaries. A 
systemic view, collective drive, and routinized practices are, therefore, indispensable 
companions of companies on their sustainability voyage. 
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Figure 1: Environmental Management Structure of Greenheart (1999) 
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Figure 2: Environmental Management Structure of Greenheart Plus (2004) 
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Table 1: Analysis of the Greenheart (Plus) Case  
 
 
 
Perspective Stakeholder influence Organizational learning 
Stage  
 
Dimension 
Rise Regression Rise Regression 
Ambition Sustainability 
of primary 
importance, 
especially at 
higher and 
middle levels 
Sustainability 
company-wide 
subordinate to 
economic 
objectives   
Substantial 
resources for 
learning and 
concurrence of 
three articulated 
learning roles 
Few resources 
for learning 
and  
concurrence of 
three less 
prominent 
roles 
Embeddedness Environmental 
issues not 
integrated and 
not core part 
of routines 
Start of 
integrating and 
routinizing 
environmental 
activities 
Conceptualization 
and ad hoc 
environmental 
measures (mainly 
explorative 
learning) 
Systematic 
implementation 
of 
environmental 
activities 
(exploitative 
learning) 
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Table 2: Typology of Corporate Sustainability Behaviour 
 
 
 
Ambition 
Embeddedness 
Low High 
Low Unsustainable business 
 
Idealist sustainability quest
High Realist environmental 
management 
Institutionalized 
sustainability 
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